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representational resources highly sensitive to smaller scale causal
(and functional) variations in the world.
Of course, learning a fabricated new species of flower is a task
limited in scope; the concept token referred to will not likely
transform all future instances of “natural kind” encountered.
But if some measure of conceptual change remains possible
throughout the life course, then concepts themselves, and not
just their associated categories, must respond to smaller scale
regularities in the causal structure of specific instances of those
concepts that are encountered.
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Abstract: We dispute Carey’s assumption that distinct core cognitive
processes employ domain-specific input analyzers to construct
proprietary representations. We give reasons to believe that conceptual
systems co-opt core components for new domains. Domain boundaries,
as well as boundaries between perceptual–motor and conceptual
cognitive resources may be useful abstractions, but do not appear to
reflect constraints respected by brains and cognitive systems.
In Carey’s proposal, core cognitive processes have a strictly cir-
cumscribed conceptual domain: “A dedicated input analyzer
computes representations of one kind of entity in the world
and only that kind” (Carey 2009, p. 451). This leads Carey to
assume that conceptual change transforms representations
within a specified domain. So, for example, Carey proposes
that the natural numbers are constructed from number-based
core processes: either parallel representation of individuals
belonging to small sets, or analog magnitude representations.
On this view, a CS2 “transcends” a CS1 – two conceptual
systems cover the same domain, but one covers that domain
more completely and more richly than the other.
Substantial empirical evidence suggests that instead, concepts in
learned theories are often built out of processes and represen-
tational vehicles taken from widely different domains. This is
especially so when the topic is abstract, as in the case of
mathematics. For example, Longo and Lourenco (2007) present
evidence that overlapping mechanisms modulate attention in
numerical and spatial tasks (see also Hubbard et al. 2005). In
their experiments, participants who show a high degree of left-
side pseudoneglect in a physical bisection task also showed a
high degree of small-number pseudoneglect in a numerical bisec-
tion task. Furthermore, this is unlikely to result just from an analo-
gical mapping between number and space used during learning,
because numerical bisection biases, like physical biases, depend
on whether numbers are physically presented in near or far
space (Longo & Lourenco 2009). This fact suggests an online con-
nection between spatial and numerical attention. Longo and Lour-
enco (2009) interpret these results in terms of shared mechanisms:
Foundational processes that guide attention in physical space are
recycled to guide attention in numerical space.
Moreover, there is ample evidence for the reuse of motor-
control systems in mathematical processing. For example,
Andress et al. (2007) report that hand motor circuits are activated
by a dot-counting task; Badets and Pesenti (2010) demonstrated
that observing grip-closure movements (but not nonbiological
closure motions) interferes with numerical magnitude proces-
sing; and Goldin-Meadow (2003) recounts the many ways in
which gesturing aids in the acquisition of mathematical concepts.
These examples suggest that the motor system offers represen-
tational resources to disparate domains.
Similarly, several authors have reported that algebraic reason-
ing co-opts mechanisms involved in perception and manipulation
of physical objects (Do¨rfler 2004; Kirshner 1989; Landy &
Goldstone 2007; Landy & Goldstone 2008). For example,
Landy and Goldstone (2007) report that reasoners systematically
utilize processes of perceptual grouping to proxy for the ordering
of algebraic operations. Again, the relationship does not appear
to be merely analogical. As Carey emphasizes, one expects analo-
gies to occur over extended durations. In contrast, Kirshner and
Awtry (2004) report that, at least, the use of spatial perception in
interpreting equation structure happens immediately upon
exposure to the spatially regular algebra notation, and must be
unlearned through the process of acquiring sophisticated alge-
braic knowledge. The most natural interpretation is that relevant
computations are performed directly on spatial representations
of symbol systems, and tend to work not because of developed
internal analogies but because the symbolic notation itself gener-
ally aligns physical and abstract properties.
In basic arithmetic knowledge, and in the algebraic understand-
ing of abstract relations, distinctly perceptual-motor processing is
applied to do conceptual work in a widely different domain.
Despite Carey’s assumption that cognitive resources are strongly
typed – some are domain-specific input analyzers, some are com-
ponents of core knowledge, others are parts of richer domain the-
ories – it appears that at least some basic cognitive resources are
used promiscuously in a variety of domains, and applied to a
variety of contents. We suggest that this is possible for two
reasons. First, on an evolutionary timescale it is more efficient to
repurpose or replicate preexisting neural structures than to build
entirely new ones. Second, many new symbolic environments,
such as a math class utilizing a number line, or algebraic notation,
form rich and multimodal experiences, which can themselves be
analyzed using preexisting cognitive processes (“core” or not).
Whenever such analyses yield largely successful results, a
learner is likely to incorporate the relevant constraints and compu-
tational systems into the conceptual apparatus (Clark 2008).
Therefore, initially dedicated mechanisms such as those governing
perceptual grouping and attention, can be co-opted, given an
appropriate cultural context, into performing highly abstract and
conceptual functions.
When we make the claim that perceptual processes are co-
opted for mathematical reasoning, for example, that automati-
cally computed spatial arrangements of physical symbols are
used as proxies for understanding generic relations, this is not a
return to old-fashioned empiricism. It is not our view that all
mathematical content can be reduced to perceptual content.
Nor is it our view that because humans are able to co-opt percep-
tual processes to do mathematics, that this implies that the
content of mathematical claims can be exhaustively reduced to
perceptual primitives. Indeed, it is important to our story that
they are not so reduced. We wish to point out that cognitive
resources that are used for perceptual and motor reasoning in
one domain are often usefully exploited for conceptual under-
standing in another domain. In fact, given the mounting evidence
for the reuse of neural systems across the boundaries of tra-
ditional cognitive domains (Anderson 2010), it would be very sur-
prising if many of our most important cognitive resources were
domain-bound in the manner of Carey’s core processes.
In short, whether on a cultural or evolutionary timescale, learn-
ing systems apply any available resources to the understanding of
new symbol systems, without regard for whether that old system is
domain-specific, “perceptual,” or “conceptual.” One important role
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of culturally constructed symbol systems is to serve, themselves, as
rich environmental structures that can be the target of pre-existing
cognitive mechanisms (“core” or otherwise). Carey’s “Quinian
bootstrapping,” which treats novel symbol systems as mere place-
holders, with no properties beyond conceptual role – that
is, their inferential relationship to other symbols in their set –
simplifies the process of learning new symbol systems at the cost
of missing much of their value.
What is the significance of The Origin of
Concepts for philosophers’ and
psychologists’ theories of concepts?
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Abstract:Carey holds that the study of conceptual development bears on
the theories of concepts developed by philosophers and psychologists. In
this commentary, I scrutinize her claims about the significance of the
study of conceptual development.
Psychologists will probably come to view The Origin of Concepts
(Carey 2009) as a landmark in the history of psychology, as
important as Piaget’s (1954) The Construction of Reality in the
Child. Among other virtues, it illustrates how extraordinarily suc-
cessful the nativist research program in developmental psychol-
ogy has been since the 1970s.
That said, The Origin of Concepts is not without shortcomings.
Here, I focus on its significance for a general theory of concepts.
In my view (Machery 2009; 2010a), philosophers and psycholo-
gists have usually focused on two distinct issues (a point Carey
acknowledges; pp. 489–91):
1. The philosophical issue: How are we able to have prop-
ositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.) about the objects of
our attitudes? For example, in virtue of what can we have
beliefs about dogs?
2. The psychological issue: Why do people categorize, draw
inductions, make analogies, combine concepts, and so forth,
the way they do? For example, why are inductive judgments sen-
sitive to similarity?
Psychologists attempt to solve the psychological issue by deter-
mining the properties of the bodies of information about cat-
egories, substances, events, and so forth, that people rely on
when they categorize, make inductions, draw analogies, and
understand words.
In the introduction (p. 5) and in the last chapter of The Origin of
Concepts (particularly, pp. 487–89, 503–508), Carey claims that
the study of conceptual development casts light on the philosophi-
cal issue. However, the reader is bound to be disappointed, for
Carey does not let the philosophical theory of reference she offi-
cially endorses – informational semantics – determine what
babies’ and toddlers’ concepts refer to; instead, she relies on her
intuitions to determine what their concepts refer to, and she
uses philosophical theories of reference to justify her intuitions.
Two aspects of Carey’s discussion support this claim. First,
quite conveniently, the philosophical views about reference
Carey discusses never lead her to conclude that babies’ and tod-
dlers’ concepts refer to something different from what she intui-
tively takes them to refer to.
Second, although Carey endorses an informational semantics,
she in fact appeals to several distinct theories of reference, and
she switches from one theory to the other when convenient.
When Carey discusses the reference of the concept of object,
she appeals to Fodor’s informational semantics (pp. 98–99),
according to which a concept (e.g., the concept of dog) refers to
the property that nomologically causes its tokening (e.g., the prop-
erty of being a dog). Elsewhere (pp. 17, 99), she seems to endorse
some (quite unspecified) version of a teleological theory of refer-
ence (of the kind developed by Millikan and Neander): a
concept refers to a particular property because the evolutionary
function of this concept (roughly, what this concept evolved to
do) is to be tokened when this property is instantiated. According
to this view, the concept of dog refers to the property of being a
dog because its function is to be tokened when dogs are perceived
(whether perceiving dogs actually causes its tokening or not).
Finally, when she discusses the reference of the analog magnitude
representations (e.g., pp. 293–95), she implicitly endorses an iso-
morphism-based conception of reference (of the type developed
by Cummins), according to which the reference of our thoughts
depends on an isomorphism between the laws that govern them
and the laws that apply to some domain of objects. On this view,
thoughts about natural numbers are about natural numbers if
and only if they obey laws that are isomorphic to the arithmetic
operations defined over natural numbers.
These theories of reference are fundamentally distinct. They
disagree about what determines the reference of concepts
(their current nomological relations with properties outside the
mind, their past evolutionary history, or the isomorphism
between the laws that govern their use and other laws), and
they also occasionally disagree about what concepts refer to. Fur-
thermore, it would do no good to propose to combine these the-
ories into an encompassing theory of reference because it would
be unclear why this encompassing theory should be preferred to
each of these theories considered on its own. Nor would it do to
simply state that different theories of reference apply to different
types of representations because one would then need to explain
why a particular theory applies to a particular type of concept.
Carey also holds that the study of conceptual development
casts some light on the psychological issue (p. 487), but what is
curious is that, she overlooks much of the psychological research
on concepts (for review, see Murphy 2002; Machery 2009), and
she promptly dismisses the principal theories of concepts devel-
oped by psychologists working on categorization, induction, and
concept combination (pp. 496–99). Her main argument is that
one needs to distinguish people’s concepts from their beliefs or
conceptions, that the psychological theories of concepts (proto-
type, exemplar, and theory theories) were developed to explain
categorization, and that research on categorization casts light
only on the nature of people’s conceptions because categoriz-
ation is holistic (pp. 490–491, 498). She also holds that psychol-
ogists’ theories of concepts are descriptivist and that descriptivism
is false.
I will briefly deal with Carey’s second argument. Psychologists’
theories of concepts are not committed to descriptivism because
they can be combined with any theory of reference (Machery
2010a, p. 235). In addition, Carey’s appeal to Kripke’s and
Putnam’s anti-descriptivist views is problematic in light of the
cross-cultural variation in intuitions about reference (Machery
et al. 2004; Mallon et al. 2009; Machery et al. 2009).
I now turn to the first argument. A theory of concepts that
attempts to explain categorization (as prototype, exemplar, and
theory theories do) is able to distinguish concepts and con-
ceptions, for one can, and should, distinguish the information
that is used by default, in a context-insensitive manner in categ-
orization (people’s concepts) from the information used in a
context-sensitive manner (their conceptions; Machery 2009,
2010b). Furthermore, the bodies of information that are used
by default in categorization are also used by default in induction,
in concept combination, and so forth. For example, typicality
effects found in categorization, induction, and concept combi-
nation show that prototypes are used in the processes underlying
all these cognitive competences. Therefore, the main psychologi-
cal theories of concepts can not only distinguish concepts from
conceptions, they are also essential to solve the psychological
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